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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 A party seeking attorney’s fees under ERISA must 
show “some success” on the merits.  Here, the District Court 
incorrectly defined “some success” by requiring evidence of 
judicial action.  We will reverse.   
 
I. 
 The Appellants, two individuals and two pharmacies, 
originally brought a denial of benefits action under the 
Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and two 
state law causes of action.  The Appellees are insurance 
companies.  The underlying claims in this dispute concerned 
the Appellees’ alleged refusal to honor Appellants’ claims for 
payment of blood-clotting-factor products.  The original 
complaint was filed in 2009.  The insurance companies 
moved to dismiss, arguing that the Appellants failed to 
exhaust their administrative remedies. 
 
 The District Court denied the motion to dismiss and 
ordered the Appellees to review the Appellants’ claims for 
benefits.  The Appellees then paid the claims in full and the 
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District Court dismissed the complaint as a result of the 
Appellees’ payments.  Following dismissal, both the 
Appellants and the Appellees filed for attorney’s fees and 
costs, which the District Court denied.  The parties appealed 
and we affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny fees.  
Templin v. Independent Blue Cross, 487 F. App’x. 6 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We remanded, however, on one issue: whether the 
Appellants were entitled to interest on the delayed payment of 
benefits.  Id. 
 
 On remand, Appellants sought interest ranging from 
approximately $1.5 to $1.8 million.  While most of this 
interest was sought under the Maryland Code, Appellants also 
demanded approximately $68,000 based on the federal 
Treasury bill rate.  The District Court convened a hearing in 
January of 2013 at which it made comments suggesting that, 
in its view, interest at the federal rate was likely appropriate, 
but that interest under the Maryland statute would be 
improper.  Based on these parameters, the District Court 
encouraged the parties to reach a settlement.  Unable to do so, 
the Appellants filed their Third Amended Complaint.  At a 
pre-trial hearing in March of 2013, the Appellees agreed to 
pay $68,000.00 in interest to the Appellants.  As a result of 
this settlement, the District Court dismissed the case.  After 
the matter had been dismissed, the Appellants filed a motion 
for attorney’s fees and costs.  They sought $349,385.15 for 
work performed from November 1, 2010 until August 4, 
2013.  The District Court denied the motion. 
 
 The District Court believed that the Appellants had 
failed to achieve “some degree of success on the merits.”  
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins., 560 U.S. 242, 255 
(2010) (citation omitted).  The Court noted that it had never 
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made a substantive determination on the question of whether 
Appellants were entitled to receive interest under the ERISA 
statute, and that the issue “was settled among the parties 
outside the courtroom and without a judgment from the 
Court.”  J.A. at 15.  It also thought that the Appellants failed 
to achieve success on the merits because the amount of 
interest they actually received—$68,000.00—was “trivial” 
when compared to the millions of dollars they originally 
sought.  Id. at 18. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), and we have 
jurisdiction to review its orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review a district court’s decision on attorney’s fees and 
costs for an abuse of discretion.  Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. 
All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 305 (2008).  “[O]ur review of 
the legal standards a district court applies in the exercise of its 
discretion is . . . plenary.”  Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension 
Bd., 956 F.2d 1268, 1273 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 
  
II. 
 The decision whether to award fees and costs usually 
involves two steps.  First, a court must determine whether the 
moving party is eligible for such an award.  If so, then courts 
evaluate the five factors we set out in Ursic v. Bethlehem 
Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983), to determine 
whether to exercise their discretion and order an award.  As 
noted previously, eligibility for an award of fees and costs in 
ERISA cases depends on whether the moving party has 
shown some degree of success on the merits, not on whether 
the moving party is the prevailing party in the litigation.  
Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254.  The Appellants argued to the District 
Court that they achieved a level of success because, after the 
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hearing in January of 2013 and after the filing of the amended 
complaint, the Appellees voluntarily changed their position 
and agreed to pay interest.  In effect, the Appellants were 
pursuing a catalyst theory of recovery.  The District Court 
acknowledged the applicability of this theory in ERISA cases 
(even though we, to date, have not), but denied recovery 
because it believed that judicial action of some type was 
needed to serve as the catalyst, not the activities of litigation 
itself.   
A. 
 We begin with the larger question whether the catalyst 
theory can be used to show some success under the ERISA 
statute.  In our legal system, each litigant typically pays his or 
her own attorney’s fees, whether they win or lose.  See Brytus 
v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2000).  However, 
some statutes provide an exception that shifts payment of one 
party’s legal fees to the other.  Id. at 242.  ERISA is one such 
statute, providing that “the court in its discretion may allow a 
reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”  
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).  Most fee-shifting provisions give 
courts the discretion to award fees only to the “prevailing 
party.”  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Prior to 2001, a 
“prevailing party” had to satisfy two requirements.  First, it 
had to “succeed on any significant issue in litigation which 
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing 
suit.”  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992).  Second, a 
prevailing party had to achieve its desired result through a 
court judgment.  We permitted a prevailing party to be 
awarded fees under a “catalyst theory” provided that the 
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s 
conduct.  See, e.g., Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing 
Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 546, 549 (3d Cir. 1994) (allowing catalyst 
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theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney Fee 
Award Act, “where … the pressure of the lawsuit was a 
material contributing factor in bringing about extrajudicial 
relief.”). 
 
 In Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia 
Dept. of Health & Human Services, the Supreme Court 
rejected  the use of a “catalyst theory” where a request for 
fees had been made under the Fair Housing Amendments Act 
of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA).  532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).  The Supreme Court 
explained that a “prevailing party” must “secure a judgment 
on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”  Id. at 600.  
We have not yet specifically determined whether, post-
Buckhannon, the catalyst theory of recovery remains 
available under ERISA.  We have little difficulty concluding 
that it does. 
 
 To begin, the ERISA statute does not limit fee awards 
to the prevailing party.  The Supreme Court specifically held 
that a claimant need not be a ‘prevailing party’ to be eligible 
for an attorney’s fees award under ERISA.  Hardt, 506 U.S. 
at 254.  Instead, “a fees claimant must show some degree of 
success on the merits before a court may award attorney’s 
fees under § 1132(g)(1).”  Id.  A party satisfies this 
requirement if a “court can fairly call the outcome of the 
litigation some success on the merits without conducting a 
‘lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular 
party’s success was ‘substantial’ or occurred on a ‘central 
issue’.”  Id.  Conversely, “[a] claimant does not satisfy that 
requirement by achieving trivial success on the merits or a 
purely procedural victory....”  Id.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
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 Additionally, the Supreme Court has specifically 
acknowledged that attorney’s fees are available even “without 
a formal court order.”  Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 
680, 687 n. 8 (1983).  Ruckelshaus “lays down the proper 
markers to guide a court in exercising the discretion that § 
1132(g)(1) grants.”  Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255.  Further, at least 
four other Courts of Appeal have applied, post-Buckhannon, 
the catalyst theory to statutes that lack prevailing-party 
requirements, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has specifically done so under the ERISA statute.  See 
Scarangella v. Group Health, Inc., 731 F.3d 146, 154-55 (2d 
Cir. 2013); see also Ohio River Valley Env’l Coalition, Inc. v. 
Green Valley Coal, 511 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2007); Sierra 
Club v. Env’l Protection Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council, 307 F.3d 
1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002).   
 
 The Appellees urge us not to endorse this theory.  
They rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon, in 
which the Supreme Court narrowed the use of the catalyst 
theory, finding that the defendant’s voluntary change of 
conduct did not establish the plaintiff as the “prevailing 
party” required for an award of attorney’s fees under the FHA 
and the ADA.  Appellees’ reliance on Buckhannon is 
misplaced.  In Hardt, the Supreme Court held that ERISA 
includes no “prevailing party” requirement and instead vests 
district courts with broader discretion to award attorney’s 
fees.  560 U.S. at 252.  The Supreme Court also drew a clear 
distinction in Hardt between statutes that require a prevailing 
party (like those at issue in Buckhannon) and statutes (like 
ERISA) that do not impose that requirement in order to 
collect fees.  We, therefore, have no trouble concluding that 
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the catalyst theory of recovery of attorney’s fees is available 
under the ERISA statute.   
 
B. 
 Although it acknowledged the likely applicability of 
the catalyst theory of recovery, the District Court nonetheless 
declined to award attorney’s fees.  Relying on the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Scarangella, 
supra., the District Court held that the Appellants “cannot 
demonstrate that the out of court agreement resolving the 
issue of interest was caused by Court action.”  Templin v. 
Independence Blue Cross, No. 09-4092, 2013 WL 6050667, 
at  *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2013) (citing Scarangella, 731 F.3d 
at 154-55).  This was error.1  To succeed under a catalyst 
theory of recovery, evidence that judicial activity encouraged 
the defendants to settle is not necessary.  All that is necessary 
is that litigation activity pressured a defendant to settle or 
render to a plaintiff the requested relief.  To hold otherwise 
                                              
1We have no particular quarrel with Scarangella.  In that 
case, the Second Circuit permits an award of attorney’s fees 
to parties (including ‘prevailing parties’ under such statutes) 
who have obtained relief without a court judgment as long as 
the settlement was “caused in some way by court action.”  
731 F.3d at 154.  Therefore, attorney’s fees must be available 
under those circumstances for ERISA, which does not even 
have a prevailing-party requirement.  Put another way, that 
fees are available under ERISA for settlements spurred by 
judicial activity does not mean that they are unavailable in a 
broader set of circumstances (e.g., settlement spurred by 
litigation activity).  
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ignores the distinction the Supreme Court drew in Hardt 
between statutes that award fees only to a prevailing party 
(which require some type of judicial action for an award of 
fees) and statutes, like ERISA, that do not limit the award in 
such a way.  See 560 U.S. at 254.   
 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardt 
specifically answers the question “how much success” is 
required for ERISA fee recoveries:  “some degree of 
success.”  560 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).  Nothing in 
Hardt requires that this success be the result of a judicial 
decision.  Instead, Hardt sets out a rather easily traversed   
threshold.  That is to say, under the catalyst theory, a party is 
eligible for attorney’s fees where his or her litigation efforts 
resulted in a voluntary, non-trivial, and more than procedural 
victory that is apparent to the court without the need to 
conduct a lengthy inquiry into whether that success was 
substantial or occurred on a central issue.2  
                                              
2 The District Court additionally concluded that the 
Appellants were ineligible for attorney's fees because the 
$68,000.00 in prejudgment interest they received was only a 
“trivial success.” See Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255.  Specifically, 
the Court believed that because the Appellants originally 
sought $1.5 million in post-judgment interest and only 
received $68,000.00, their success was trivial in terms of the 
total amount sought.  We disagree.  The standard for 
establishing “some success” is a low one.  Here, the relief 
Appellants received was sufficient for an award of attorney’s 
fees.  Indeed, the amount of recovery is not as important as is 
the fact that they did recover interest at 100% of the federal 
interest rate.  Put another way, although the Appellants did 
not obtain their desired amount of interest, they did accept the 
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 Under this standard, the Appellants here are eligible 
for such an award.  The record shows that the Appellants 
achieved some degree of success on the merits.  At the 
hearing in January of 2013, the District Court indicated that 
Appellants were likely entitled to interest at the federal rate.  
Less than two months later, after Appellants filed their Third 
Amended Complaint, the parties settled for $68,000, which 
represented 100% of the interest sought under the federal 
statute.  Applying the catalyst theory, we find that the 
pressure of the lawsuit caused Appellees to change their 
position and provide Appellants with the interest they 
demanded.  Nor was the Appellants’ success a purely 
procedural achievement.  See id., at 255.  Such an 
accomplishment contemplates success on a procedural as 
opposed to a substantive issue, the winning of a motion for 
class certification, or a motion to intervene, for example.3  
That is not what happened here.  Appellants received what 
they asked for in their complaint, clearly a substantive 
victory.  Put another way, because the Appellants settled this 
matter with the Appellees for the full interest amount they 
sought, they have easily achieved some degree of success on 
the merits.  See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) 
                                                                                                     
total amount that was available under the federal interest rate: 
$68,000.00.  Given this, we cannot agree that the Appellants’ 
success in pushing the Appellees to pay interest was trivial. 
 
3 A victory on such motions is procedural in nature because 
such success does not bring the winning party any closer to its 
desired relief.  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has noted, a “procedural victory that may be a way 
station to utter substantive defeat creates no right to fees.”  
Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 119 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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(“the fact that [a party] prevailed through a settlement rather 
than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.”).  
See also Truesdell v. Phila. Housing Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 164 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
III. 
 However, even where a party can show some success 
on the merits, as the Appellants have done here, a court still 
has the discretion to grant or deny fees.  See Hardt, 560 U.S. 
at 255 n. 8.  In deciding whether to exercise such discretion, 
we have instructed that a district court must consider the 
following factors: 
 
(1) the offending parties' 
culpability or bad faith;  
(2) the ability of the offending 
parties to satisfy an award of 
attorney's fees; 
(3) the deterrent effect of an 
award of attorney’s fees; 
(4) the benefit conferred upon 
members of the pension plan as a 
whole; and  
(5) the relative merits of the 
parties' positions.  
 
Ursic,  719 F.2d at 673 (3d Cir. 1983).  “Our case law makes 
clear that . . . the amount of a fee award is within the district 
court’s discretion so long as it employs correct standards and 
procedures and makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous.”  
Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 329 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc).  Here, because the District Court misapplied 
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the first Ursic factor and failed to apply the fifth, its overall 
analysis of all the factors was tainted.4  This was an abuse of 
the District Court’s discretion. 
 
 The first Ursic factor concerns the offending party’s 
culpability or bad faith.  A party is culpable if it is “blamable; 
censurable[or] at fault.”  McPherson v. Employees’ Pension 
Plan of American Re-Insurance Co. Inc., 33 F.3d 253, 257 
(3d Cir. 1994).  Culpable conduct is “reprehensible or wrong” 
but need not involve “malice or a guilty purpose.”  Id.  The 
Court concluded that this factor cuts against an award of 
attorney’s fees because the Appellees were not “solely 
culpable for delays in the litigation.”  J.A. at 20-21.  That 
rationale is insufficient as a basis to deny fees.  This factor 
concerns the culpability of the offending party, that is, the 
party against whom fees are sought.  Whether the Appellants 
are also culpable, on its own, does not cut against an award of 
attorney’s fees.  Indeed, the District Court here would have 
needed, at a minimum, to weigh the parties’ culpability 
against each other to support its holding, an inquiry it did not 
undertake.  Also, the District Court noted that the Appellees 
did not act culpably for refusing to “originally pay [ ] the 
claims.”  J.A. at 20-21.  This determination is not dispositive.  
Even if the Appellees did not act culpably in the merits phase 
of the litigation, this does not answer the question whether 
they acted culpably in the second phase by refusing to pay 
pre-judgment interest.  That is the more important inquiry 
                                              
4 The second factor, ability of the Appellants to pay, supports 
an award of attorney’s fees here.  The District Court 
determined that both Appellees can pay Appellants' attorney 
fees.  J.A. at 21.  Neither party disputes this finding on 
appeal.   
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because the Appellants are only seeking compensation for 
attorney’s fees which accrued in pursuit of pre-judgment 
interest, not fees accrued in pursuit of the underlying claims 
for reimbursement.  And the Appellants specifically argued 
that Appellees were culpable because they refused to pay 
interest for over two years after paying the underlying 
reimbursement claims.  The District Court cannot properly 
hold that the Appellees were not culpable without deciding 
whether they were culpable during the most relevant period of 
the litigation. 
 
 The District Court also failed to apply the fifth Ursic 
factor, which focuses on the relative merits of the parties’ 
positions.  The Court did not include this factor in its analysis 
because “the Defendants paid the interest through a 
settlement process, [and] the Court never adjudicated the 
merits of the parties’ positions.”  J.A. at 22.  This conclusion 
was erroneous.  District courts are required to consider each 
of the Ursic factors.  Anthius v. Colt Ind. Operating Corp., 
971 F.2d 999, 1011 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[O]ur requirement that 
district courts consider and analyze [Ursic] factors [is] a 
mandatory requirement.”); see also Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255 n. 
8.  Appellee CareFirst argues that the District Court found 
this factor to be of neutral application, but that misconstrues 
the record.  The Court did not consider this factor to be 
neutral but instead failed to analyze the factor at all.  Further, 
its failure to do so may have also tainted its analysis of the 
first factor.  If it had, the District Court could have concluded 
that the Appellees’ legal position was meritless and then 
concluded that the Appellees were culpable under the first 
Ursic factor.  
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 Because of the close relationship between culpability 
(factor 1), the relative merits (factor 5), and deterrence (factor 
3), we are concerned that the Court’s misapplication of the 
first and fifth factor tainted its analysis of the third.  Further, 
the Court’s analysis of the fourth factor raises similar 
concerns as it focused on deterrence.  See McPherson, 33 
F.3d at 255-56.  Thus, we conclude that the District Court 
misapplied the Ursic factors when it declined to grant 
attorney’s fees. 
 
IV. 
 Today, we hold that the District Court used an 
incorrect legal standard to evaluate the Appellants’ eligibility 
for attorney’s fees and misapplied the Ursic factors, errors 
which tainted the District Court’s assessment of an award of 
attorney’s fees and its evaluation of the merits of the parties’ 
positions.  The ‘catalyst theory’ of recovery is available to the 
Appellants, and judicial action is not required under that 
theory in order to establish some degree of success.  Here, the 
Appellants have crossed this threshold and are eligible for an 
award of fees and costs. 
 
 However, being eligible for an award and receiving 
that award are not the same thing.  We express no opinion as 
to whether attorney’s fees should be awarded to the 
Appellants on remand.  That will be for the District Court to 
decide based upon the exercise of its discretion and a correct 
analysis of the Ursic factors.  We will reverse the District 
Court’s order denying attorney’s fees and costs and will 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
